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Carbon Leakage Versus Policy Diffusion:
The Perils and Promise of Subglobal Climate Action
Daniel A. Farber*

Abstract
Climate change is a global problem that will ulimately require a concerted global
response. Polig analysts, however, are divided about whether individualjurisdictions and
groups ofjurisdictions should take the initiative in the meantime. This Article argues in favor
of subglobalefforts, both for their direct efects on emissions and their role as steps towardglobal
cooperation. Some analysts argue that subglobal efforts are futile because of the problem of
carbon leakage. More careful analyses, however, have shown that leakage is unlikely to pose a
severe threat to the effectiveness of well-designed subglobal mitgation efforts. Poliy design can
manage leakage levels and prevent them from frustrating mitigation efforts. Moreover,
mitgation efforts in one set ofjurisdictions seem more likely to increase ratherthan decrease the
likelihood of mitgation elsewhere. By building confidence among the key actors, subglobal
actions can heo pave the way for broader internationalcooperation. Indeed, without prior
subglobal efforts, it is dfficult to imagine a successful global agreement. Subglobal efforts are
needed as confidence-building measures, providing a basis for mutual cooperation. Subglobal
efforts are also needed to eperiment with and improve poliy instruments that can then be
launched at the global level. In short, subglobal efforts are not only desirable but indispensable.

Table of Contents
.....................
I. Introduction
II. Subglobal Climate Efforts and Motives

.......
.......
...................

....... 360
..... 363

Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. I would like to thank Juscelino
Colares, Andrew Guzman, Katerina Linos, and Elizabeth Wilson for helpful comments on
previous drafts. I also benefited from discussions at The University of Chicago Law School's
Conference on Climate justice and at a workshop at the 2012 Berkeley faculty retreat.

359

Chicagojournalof InternationalLaw

..................................
A. Climate Efforts in the US...
.......................
B. Other Developed Country Actions
C. Developing Countries: The Case of China ......................
..............................
III. Leakage from Subglobal Efforts .
IV. Strategic Benefits and Costs of Subglobal Action............
V. Conclusion...............................................

363
.... 365
367
368
...... 372
378

I. INTRODUCTION
Climate change is a global problem that will ultimately require a concerted
global response.! Policy analysts are divided, however, about whether individual
jurisdictions and groups of jurisdictions should take the initiative in the
meantime. This Article argues in favor of subglobal efforts, both for their direct
effects on emissions and their role as steps toward global cooperation. But the
issues are not simple.
Critics argue that subglobal action is futile if not counterproductive.
According to Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach, "local initiatives address the
climate problem in an extremely inefficient way, and probably not at all."'2 In
their view, "[r]aising the cost of energy production or consumption in one city
or state will predictably cause people and businesses to migrate to other states,
where they can continue to pollute."' Thus, they argue, subglobal climate action
is symbolic rather substantive, meant to persuade the public that something is

1

See, for example, Kirsten H. Engel and Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons:
The Case of Cmate Change, 32 Ecol L Q 183, 187 (2005) (endorsing the need for global action by
advocates of state climate regulation). Without global agreement, it may be impossible even for a
0
large coalition of nations to achieve a goal of limiting climate change to 2 C. See Henry D.
Jacoby, et al, Sharing the Burden of GHG Reductions, Discussion Paper 08-09 *13 (Harvard Project
on International Climate Agreements 2008), online at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/
files/JacobyWeb2.pdf (visited Oct 17, 2012). This does not necessarily mean that less ambitious
climate goals would be unattainable by coalitions. But even taking the ultimate need for global
cooperation as a given, there remains the question of what interim steps would be constructive.

2

Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach, Climate Change justice 69 (Princeton 2010), reviewed by
Daniel A. Farber, Climate Justice, 110 Mich L Rev 985 (2012). See also Rachel Brewster, Stepping
Stone or Stumbling Block: Incrementalism and National Climate Change Legislation, 28 Yale L & Poly Rev
245, 246-47 (2009-10); Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Clmate
Policies, 155 U Pa L Rev 1961, 1963 (2006-07) (describing the efforts as "counterproductive").

3

Posner and Weisbach, Cmate Change Justice at 69 (cited in note 2). Moreover, they write,
jurisdictions that display a strong preference for climate action and would suffer from climate
change lose bargaining power because they cannot credibly threaten to walk away from
negotiations. Id at 194. The prospect of such a weakened negotiating posture could deter interim
ntigation measures.
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being done without paying the costs of genuine mitigation:' "Symbols, not
substance, have been the order of the day."s In short, Posner and Weisbach say,
"unilateral actions can have little impact on the problem, and so it makes sense
to await a treaty rather than put in place expensive but unhelpful regulations." 6
This line of argument is supported by the matching principle, which holds
that the level of governance should match the scale of the harm being regulated.'
In contrast, other writers reject the matching principle and forcefully advocate
subglobal action, at least until a global regime is in place.'
The dispute about the consequences of subglobal action is related to a
normative debate about whether, in the absence of a climate treaty, major
sources have a duty to reduce their carbon emissions.' The answer to that
question may depend partly on an individual's moral framework, but in almost
anyone's framework, the consequences of subglobal action will be relevant to
assessing its ethical status.
This Article will present the case in favor of subglobal action. Section II
will provide a brief update on notable subglobal efforts within the US and
elsewhere.10 Section III turns to potential forms of carbon leakage that might
4

Id at 60.

5

Id at 59. The modesty of initial subglobal efforts, however, can be seen as part of an iterative
process of confidence building rather than a sign of a lack of serious intent.

6

Id at 8.

?

See Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Prina e: The Case for
ReallocatingEnironmentalRegulatory Authority, 14 Yale L & Poly Rev 23, 35 (1996).

8

See Engel and Saleska, 32 Ecol L Q at 187-88, 223 (cited in note 1).

9

See, for example, Joakim Sandberg, 'My Emissions Make No Difference": Climate Change and the
Argument from Inconsequenialirsm, 33 Envir Ethics 229 (2011) (exploring the ethical arguments in
depth); Posner and Weisbach, Climate Change justice at 104 (cited in note 2) (questioning "whether
people are morally obliged to cut back on greenhouse gas emissions if others are not doing the
same'); Daniel Farber, The Case for Climate Compensation: Justice for Climate Change Victims in a
Complex World, 2008 Utah L Rev 377 (2008) (arguing contra Posner and Weisbach in favor of a
duty to mitigate); Paul G. Harris, ed, China's Responsibility for Climate Change: Ethics, Fairness, and
Entironmental Polig (Bristol 2011) (arguing that China has a growing responsibility for climate
change). The normative case for a duty to mitigate becomes easier if subglobal action can be
expected to result in lower global carbon levels or further a global agreement, and more difficult
to the extent that the opposite is true. But given the number of possible moral theories that might
be invoked, drawing a stronger conclusion is complicated.

10

The motivations behind such efforts are complex. See Peter Christoff and Robyn Eckersley,
Comparing State Responses, in John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, and David Schlosberg, eds, The
Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society 431, 444 (Oxford 2011) ("It should be clear from the
foregoing analysis that the quest to find a single cause, or even a common set of drivers, to
explain climate leaders or climate laggards is a near-futile exercise."). For present purposes, the
effects of subglobal efforts are more important than their motivations. Nevertheless, the existence
of a wide range of motivations also suggests the possibility of a diverse set of levers that could be
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undermine subglobal efforts. Leakage could include capital flight to higher
emitting jurisdictions as well as indirect impacts on emissions through changes
in fuel prices. Section III concludes that leakage, while a potential problem,
should not eliminate the benefits of properly designed subglobal efforts. Section
IV then considers the impact of subglobal mitigation efforts on similar efforts
by other jurisdictions. Regulatory spillover effects could result in slacking off in
efforts by other jurisdictions, but could also prompt mitigation efforts by others,
a form of incremental multilateralism." On balance, the positive spillover effects
of subglobal action are likely to predominate. Section V concludes by stressing
the limited downside and important upside potential of subglobal actions to
reduce carbon emissions while paving the road for global cooperation.
Skeptics do raise legitimate questions about the utility of subglobal action.
Despite the possibility that such actions may cause capital flight or otherwise
stimulate increases in emissions by outsiders, however, the weight of the
evidence discussed in Section III demonstrates that subglobal actions can
mitigate climate change. Under plausible assumptions, incremental subglobal
actions also increase the likelihood that other actors, too, will find mitigation
attractive, thereby improving the likelihood that a global regime will emerge.
Thus, while they have value as symbols and as carbon reductions, subglobal
actions also have strategic value in advancing global mitigation efforts.12
In Massachusetts v EPA, 3 Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court presented
a commonsense view of the desirability of incremental, subglobal measures: "A
reduction in domestic emissions would slow the pace of global emissions
increases, no matter what happens elsewhere."1 4 That is certainly true in terms of
used by some jurisdictions to help motivate others. This Article assumes that at least countries are
more likely to initiate or join a subglobal effort to the extent that (1) benefits are less likely to be
undermined by leakage, (2) costs are lower, and (3) the subglobal effort increases the prospects
for a later global agreement. These assumptions about the relative likelihood of mitigation efforts
seem plausible regardless of one's model for state behavior.

11

For discussion of multilateral incrementalism as a climate strategy, see Rafael Leal-Arcas,
Alternative Architecturefor Climate Change: Major Economies, 4 Eur J Legal Studies 25, 36-38, 55-56
(2011).

12

In economic terms, the question could be posed as to whether subglobal climate efforts are
strategic substitutes or strategic complements. These concepts stem from a seminal paper, Jeremy
I. Bulow, John D. Geanakoplos, and Paul D. Klemperer, Mulimarket Olgopoly: Strategic Substitutes
and Complements, 93 J Pol Econ 488 (1985). More recent research indicates, however, that the game
theoretic formulations of this concept may not produce stable equilibria, a finding that
undermines their utility for policy analysis. See Federico Echenique and Aaron Edlin, Mixed
EquifibriaAre Unstablein Games of Strategic Complements, 118 J Econ Theory 61 (2004). In any event,
while evocative, the analogy to this economics issue will not be pursued in this Article.

13

549 US 497 (2007).

14

Id at 526.

362

Vol. 13 No. 2

Farber

CarbonLeakage Versus Policy Diffusion

the first-order effects. The situation is more complex, however, because secondorder effects can either bolster or counter this primary effect. In the end,
however, Justice Stevens was right that such subglobal actions provide the best
prospect for progress. Indeed, if countries wait until a global international
agreement is reached before taking any action of their own against climate
change, it is hard to see how such an agreement could ever be reached.
II. SUBGLOBAL CLIMATE EFFORTS AND MOTIVES
A comprehensive survey of climate mitigation efforts around the world, or
even within various levels of government in the United States, would require a
lengthy tome. This section will not attempt such a survey, but it is important to
provide some sense of the scope and variety of subglobal efforts. The sample of
mitigation efforts discussed in this section provides some concrete context for
the more theoretical discussion that follows in Sections III and IV.
A. Climate Efforts in the US
Subglobal efforts can take place at various levels of government. In the US,
state governments have actively engaged with the issue of climate change." By
2006, every state had taken steps of some kind to address climate change." As of
2009, twenty-one states had established goals for greenhouse gas (GHG)
emission reductions, and nearly a thousand mayors had endorsed such a goal."
One of the most popular state policies is the adoption of renewable portfolio
standards (RPSs), which require that a certain percentage of retail electricity sales
be derived from renewable sources.'" California's RPS has an especially
ambitious 33 percent target by 2020.'9

15

Regional efforts are described in Eleanor Stein, RegionalIniiatives to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions,
in Michael B. Gerrard, ed, Global Climate Change and U.S. Law 315 (American Bar Association
2007); David Hodas, State Iniiaives,in Gerrard, ed, Global Climate Change 343. A survey of state
efforts can be found in Pace Law School Center for Environmental Legal Studies, The State
Response to Clmate Change:50-State Surry, in Gerrard, ed, Global Climate Change 371.

16

Hodas, State Iniiadves at 343 (cited in note 15). See also Edella C. Schlager, Kirsten H. Engel, and
Sally Rider, eds, Natigating Climate Change Poliy: The Opportuniies of Federalism (Arizona 2011)
(providing a collection of thoughtful evaluations of this trend).

17

Michael Burger, Empowering Local Autonomy and Encouraging Experimentation in Cmate Change
Governance: The Casefor a LayeredRegme, 39 Envir L Rptr 11161, 11163 (2009).

is

Michael B. Gerrard, Introduction, in Gerrard, ed, Climate Change 1, 22 (cited in note 15).

19

California Air

Resources Board, RPS Prgram Overview, online
.gov/PUC/energy/Renewables/overview (visited Oct 17, 2012).
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In California, efforts focusing specifically on climate change date back to
1988, when AB 4420 called for the first inventory of in-state greenhouse gas
emissions.20 In 2006, Governor Schwarzenegger signed the California Global
Warming Solutions Act of 2006, or AB 32,21 which requires California to reduce
emissions to the 1990 level by 2020.22 This law generated worldwide attention,
including a statement by the British prime minister that its signing represented a
"historic day for the rest of the world as well."23 The prime minister and the
governor of California also entered into an agreement to share best practices on
market-based systems and to cooperate to investigate new technologies; similar
agreements now exist between California and states and provinces in Australia
and Canada.24
California's effort cannot be characterized as merely symbolic. In
implementing AB 32, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) first
developed "discrete early action greenhouse gas emission reduction measures," 25
some of which focus on reducing emissions of high global warming potential
(GWP) gases. Another important early action was a low-carbon fuel standard to
reduce the GHG intensity of transportation fuels by 10 percent by 2020.26 A
recently adopted cap-and-trade program sets a declining, statewide cap on GHG
emissions and covers about 600 industrial facilities.27
States have also combined efforts in regional programs," including the
Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) as well as initiatives in
New England, the Great Plains, the Southwest, and the West Coast. 29 RGGI,
20

State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission, 1988 Cal Assembly Bill
4420, ch 1506.

21

2006 Cal Assembly Bill 32, ch 488, codified at Cal Health & Safety Code

22

Erwin Chemerinsky, et al, Cakfornia, Climate Change, and the Constitution, 37 Envir L Rptr 10653,
10653 (2007).

23

Id at 10654.

24

Id at 10659.

25

Cal Health & Safety Code § 38560.5(a-b).

26

Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Executive Order S-01-07 (an
http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/eos0107.pdf (visited Oct 17, 2012).

27

See generally California Environmental Protection Agency Air Resources Board, ARB Emissions
Trading ProgramOveniew, online at http://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/2010/capandtrade.pdf (visited
Oct 17, 2012).

28

See Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A RegionalApproach, 14
NYU Envir L j 54, 65 (2005-06).

29

Stein, Regional Initiatives at 316 (cited in note 15). For more on systems other than the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, see id at 326-31.
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which currently comprises nine states,30 created a multistate trading system for
power plant emissions with the goal of achieving a 10 percent reduction by
2018.
Action has also begun at the federal level, despite a lack of action from
Congress. In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v EPA,
the EPA made a formal finding that greenhouse gases endanger human health
and safety.3 2 With this finding as a foundation, the EPA has developed
regulations to reduce greenhouse gases.33 These measures, which were recently
upheld by the DC Circuit,3 4 will result in measurable reductions in US emissions.
For instance, EPA regulation of power plants could "capture a potential
reduction of 5 to 10 percent in GHG emissions from coal-as much as about 3
percent of total US emissions."" In general, "it appears a regulatory approach
could achieve emissions reductions through mitigation in the domestic economy
of up to 10 percent, relative to 2005 levels," which "would be comparable to
domestic reductions that would have been achieved under the legislative capand-trade proposal.""
B. Other Developed Country Actions
The European Union has also been an energetic subglobal actor. The EU
began operating the world's first mandatory carbon dioxide emissions trading

30

Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), online at http://www.rggi.org/
2012) (an initiative of the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic States of the US).

31

See RGGI, ProgramDesign, online at http://www.rggi.org/design (visited Oct 17, 2012).

(visited Oct 17,

32

See United States Environmental Protection Agency, Endangerment and Cause or ContributeFindings
for Greenhouse Gases under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, online at http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/endangerment (visited Oct 17, 2012).

33

The regulations are described on the EPA website. See US Environmental Protection Agency,
Regulatoy Initiatives, online at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/initiatives/index.htmi (visited
Oct 17, 2012).

34

Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc v EnvironmentalProtection Ageng, 684 F3d 102, 113 (DC Cir
2012).

3s

Dallas Burtraw, Arthur G. Fraas, and Nathan D. Richardson, Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the
Clean Air Act: A Guide for Economists, Discussion Paper 11-08 *14 (Resources for the Future
2011), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1759571 (visited Oct 17, 2012).

36

Id at *16. A more recent study indicates that EPA measures combined with state measures and
shifts in fossil fuel markets will allow the US to meet its Copenhagen commitment to reduce
emissions. See Dallas Burtraw and Matthew Woerman, US Status on Climate Change Miigation,
Discussion
Paper
12-48
(Resources
for
the
Future
2012),
online
at
http://www.rff.org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.aspx?PublicationlD=22073
(visited
Oct 25, 2012).
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scheme in January 2005." For internal political reasons, the EU distributed to
"its then 15 member countries its internationally agreed target, ranging (relative
to the 1990 base period) from cuts of 28 percent (Luxembourg) to an allowed
increase of 27 percent (Portugal)."" EU members then established their own
trading programs, using a variety of schemes to allocate permits to their
industries.39 The program got off to a rocky start." Allowance prices have
fluctuated from as little as one euro to as many as thirty. 4' A third phase, with
more ambitious targets and greater use of auctioning, will launch across 201321.42

Despite its flaws, the European trading system (ETS) has reduced
emissions by an estimated fifty to one hundred megatons per year, or 2.5 percent
to 5 percent.4 3 The program may also have broader significance. By establishing
"a system that will demonstrate the societal decision that GHG emissions shall
have a price and to provide the signal of what constitutes appropriate short-term
and long-term measures to limit GHG emissions," the European Union "has
done more with the ETS, despite all its faults, than any other nation or set of
nations."" The sticking points encountered in the first rounds of EU
implementation also provide valuable information about program design.

37

European Commission, Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) (Nov 2010),
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index-en.htm (visited Oct 17, 2012).

38

Richard N. Cooper, Europe'sEmissions TradingSystem, Discussion Paper 10-40 *2 (Harvard Project
on International Climate Agreements 2010), online at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/
files/CooperETSfinal.pdf (visited Oct 17, 2012).

39

See id at *2-5.

40

For discussion of some of the design defects, see Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Poiy Challenges of
Tradable Credits:A CriticalReview ofEightMarkets, 39 Ener Poly 575, 581 (2011).

41

William C. Whitesell, Climate Polig Foundations: Science and Economics with Lessons from Monetay
Regulation 176 (Cambridge 2011). The low initial price resulted from an over-allocation of
allowances. See Lesley McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade: Moving Toward
Stringeng, 34 Colum J Envir L 395, 397 (2009); Susan J. Kurkowski, Distributingthe Right to Pollute in
the European Union: Effideng, Equiy, and the Environment, 14 NYU Envir L J 698, 724 (2005-06).
For more information on design problems in the EU system, see Denny Ellerman and Paul L.
Joskow, The European Union's Emissions Trading System in Perspective 32 (Pew Center Reports 2008),
online at http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/EU-ETS-In-Perspective-Report.pdf (visited Oct 17,
2012). For information on the design of the trading system, see European Commission EU
Emissions Trading System (cited in note 37).

42

See Cooper, Europe'sEmissions at 13-14 (cited in note 38).

43

Posner and Weisbach, Climate ChangeJustice at 68 (cited in note 2).

44

Ellerman and Joskow, Emissions TradingSystem at 46 (cited in note 41).
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On the other side of the world, Australia has recently launched a
combination of an initial carbon tax with a later trading system.4'5 The long-term
goal is an 80 percent reduction in greenhouse gases to below 2000 levels by
2050.46 Because of a price cap on allowances, the trading system could in effect
convert back into an emission charge system if the cap is reached.47
Systematic data about national efforts and their effectiveness are not easy
to come by. A study by the Australian government of the electricity sector found
a range across countries, with Germany and the UK well in the forefront and
other countries showing only minor reductions to estimated emissions compared
with business as usual.48
C. Developing Countries: The Case of China
Although developed countries have been most willing to incur costs in
mitigating climate change, there has also been some movement among
developing countries. By 2010, "China ha[d] persuaded some commentators that
it looks forward to a world with lower greenhouse gas emissions and plans to
profit by investing in green technology." 49 At that point, however, other
observers believed it had "not yet shown a serious commitment to reducing.
greenhouse gas emissions." 0 But China's Twelfth Five-Year Plan, which covers
2011-15, now includes a 16 percent reduction in energy intensity and an 11.4
percent increase in the share of energy produced by non-fossil energy." The
plan also establishes a longer-term goal of establishing a carbon trading market.5 2
China has also announced that it is "willing to bear the obligations of a
legally binding commitment," provided such a commitment is "matched with
China's economic development and capabilities based on the principles of
45

See Lisa Caripis, et al, Australia's Carbon PricingMechanism, 2 Climate L 583, 585 (2011).

46

Id.

47

Id at 592. The price cap is AUD $20 above the international price of allowances for 2015-16. Id.

48

Productivity Commission, Carbon Emission Polides in Key Economies *75 (Commonwealth of
Australia Research Report, Feb 15, 2012), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2006078 (visited
Oct 17, 2012).

49

Posner and Weisbach, Climate ChangeJustice at 60 (cited in note 2).

50

Id.

51

Joanna Lewis, Energy and Climate Goals of China's 12th Five-Year Plan 1 (Pew 2011), online at
(visited
http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/energy-climate-goals-china-twelfth-five-year-plan.pdf

Oct 17, 2012).
52

Id at 2. More recently, China announced a plan to reduce the energy intensity per unit of GDP by
16 percent below 2010 levels by 2015. Michael Standaert, China Releases Plan for Saving Energ,
CuttingEmissions,Pledges USS372 Bildon, 36 Intl Envir Rptr (BNA) 826 (2012).
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common but differentiated responsibilities, fair[ness] and environmental
integrity."53 China has made energy goals part of its "cadre system" for
promotions, demotions, and pay levels for government officials, which creates a
strong incentive for officials to ensure that the goals are met.5 4 Perhaps not
coincidentally, China is also beginning to recognize the serious threats that it
faces from climate change." These steps are still inadequate, but they are at least
a beginning.
This section has presented merely a sample of the diverse efforts now
taking place. These various efforts seem promising, but they may come to
naught if the operation of global markets merely transfers those emissions
elsewhere. This "leakage" effect is the subject of the next section.
III. LEAKAGE FROM SUBGLOBAL EFFORTS
Reducing the use of carbon fuels is an economic act, and it has market
consequences that can amplify emissions elsewhere. Leakage can occur in several
ways: (1) limits on fossil fuels lower their prices, increasing the demand in other
sectors or in other jurisdictions (the price effect); (2) capital investment may
move to countries with fewer emissions controls (the capital effect); or (3) other
countries may feel less need to abate emissions given that others are doing so
(the slack-off effect)." The slack-off effect is mediated by political institutions
rather than economic ones and relates to the strategic effects of subglobal
climate action, which will be discussed in Section IV. The market-driven price
and capital effects will be the focus here. We begin with the price effect.
The price effect has received particular attention in the context of energy
conservation measures, where it is commonly called the "rebound effect."" The
rebound effect involves increases in energy use that are paradoxically caused by
improved energy efficiency. Because of the rebound effect, it is even
s3

5

China Sets Conditions on Binding Climate Change Commitment After 2020, English.news.cn (Dec 6,
online at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2011-12/06/c_131290906.htm
2011),
(visited Oct 17, 2012).
Alex Wang, The Searchfor Sustainable Legitimay: EnvironmentalLaw and Bureaucrag in China, 34 Harv
Envir L Rev (forthcoming 2013) (on file with the author).

ss

See Daniel A. Farber, The Challenge of Climate Change Adaptation: Learningfrom National Planning
Efforts in Britain, China, andthe USA, 23 J Envir L (UK) 359, 368 (2011).

56

See Wiener, 155 U Pa L Rev at 1967-68 (cited in note 2); Cary Coglianese and Jocelyn
D'Ambrosio, Poligmaking UnderPressure: The Perils of IncrementalResponses to Climate Change, 40 Conn
L Rev 1411, 1419-20 (2008).

57

The rebound effect received popular attention in David Owen, The Effiieng Dilemma, New Yorker
78 (Dec 20, 2010). As discussed in the text, the evidence does not support Owen's rather alarmist
portrayal, but the issue is genuine.
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theoretically possible that increased energy efficiency could actually lead to
greater total consumption of energy. This extreme form of rebound is most
likely with regard to industrial uses of energy where increased energy efficiency
might raise levels of productivity and economic growth, which would in turn
increase the overall use of energy."
The key question regarding the price effect is the size of leakage or
rebound. In terms of rebound, the evidence suggests that under most
circumstances the magnitude is small to moderate. According to a 2010 review
of the economic literature, "there seems to be some evidence for direct rebound
under certain conditions like a large unsatisfied demand," but the studies do not
support large rebound otherwise. 9 In developed countries the rebound seems to
be below 30 percent, but rebound from efficiency measures in developing
countries may be higher because of unmet demand.o
The European Union completed a major study of the rebound effect in
2011." The study estimates direct rebound effects of 5 percent to 12 percent for
lighting in developed countries and 15 percent to 20 percent for heating/cooling
and appliances.6 2 In general, economy-wide (indirect) rebound seems to be
around 10 percent, although it is difficult to estimate. Policymakers are taking
these effects into account. For instance, the UK energy agency "accepts the
existence of the direct rebound effects in relevant policy interventions, and
officially incorporates "take back" in energy savings from rebound in policy
evaluation.64

58

Sheetal Gavankar and Roland Geyer, The Rebound Efect: State of the Debate and Implicationsfor Energy
Efdcieng Research *52-53 (Bren School of Environmental Science and Management, June 26,
2010), online at http://iee.ucsb.edu/files/pdf/Rebound/ 20Report/o20for%20IEE-UCSB.pdf
(visited Oct 17, 2012).

59

Id at *46.

6o

Id at *61. For some recent evidence against a basic form of rebound (increased use of more
efficient products), see Shakeb Afsah and Kendyl Salcito, Non-Conundrum of the Pdnus Fallag, CO2
Scorecard (Mar 26, 2010), online at http://co2scorecard.org/home/researchitem/23 (visited Oct
17, 2012).

61

Dorothy Maxwell, et al, Addressing the Rebound Effect (Final Report, European Commission
at
2011),
online
26,
Apr
the
Environment,
for
Directorate-General
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eussd/pdf/rebound-effectreport.pdf (visited Oct 17, 2012).

62

Id at *82.

63
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Like studies of rebound, studies of leakage have produced varying results.s
Estimates in the 1990s ranged from 4 percent to 100 percent." A 2004 study
produced estimates ranging up to 130 percent." Modeling results for Kyoto
indicated leakage rates of 5 percent to 20 percent. 8 However, leakage rates for
particular energy-intensive commodities such as cement and steel could be much
higher.69
More recent studies seem to produce more modest estimates of leakage,
particularly if countermeasures are implemented. A recent study by Resources
for the Future (RFF)" found that the highest sectorial leakage level was around
27 percent for petroleum refineries, 71 with an average rate across industries of
around 5 percent with the use of offsetting measures such as output subsidies or
trade adjustments. 72 The RFF study also "estimate[d] that about half of traderelated leakage from the US to non-policy countries is due directly to changes in
the volume of trade, and the other half to higher emissions intensities in nonAnnex I trading partners induced by lower world fuel prices." 73
A team from The University of Chicago and Argonne National Laboratory
conducted another recent study,74 which considered the effect of adopting a
carbon tax in the developed countries. They found that such a tax would result
in significant global emission reductions and only modest leakage:
In our simulations, a carbon tax in the Kyoto Protocol Annex B nations
(which roughly make up the developed world) will produce only about one65

For a concise overview of the leakage literature, see Gabriel Weil, Costs, Contributions,and Climate
Change: How Important Are Universally Binding Emissions Commitments?, 23 Georgetown Intl Envir L

Rev 319, 319-20 (2011).
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Wiener, 155 U Pa L Rev at 1969 (cited in note 2).
Id at 1970, citing Mustafa H. Babiker, Climate Change Policy, Market Structure, and Carbon Leakage, 65
441 (2005).
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Julia Reinaud, Issues Behind Competitiveness and Carbon Leakage: Focus on Heaty Industy 33
(International Energy Agency 2008).
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Muliple Time Frames, Discussion Paper 12-27 (Resources for the Future 2012), online at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2099768 (visited Oct 17, 2012).
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third of the reductions of a global tax. Leakage, however, is only a modest
part of the story. Our central measures for leakage under a carbon tax in
Annex B, defined as the increase in emissions in the non-taxing region as a
fraction of emissions reductions in the taxing region, are in the 15-25
percent range.75
The study also found that border tax adjustments reduced leakage substantially."6
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has criticized the
earlier studies showing high leakage rates for assuming obtuse policy designs:
Results with high leakage therefore reflect conditions in which countries
implement policies that lead to most emission savings being obtained by
industrial relocation (to areas of lower-cost, and in some cases less efficient,
production), rather than in the less mobile sectors (such as power
generation, domestic, services, etc.). In practice, most countries have tended
to adjust policies to avoid any such outcome (for example through
derogation, exemption or protection for such sectors).77
In addition, according to the IPCC, other factors may tend to reduce
leakage: "[Ijn practice, carbon leakage is unlikely to be substantial because
transport costs, local market conditions, product variety and incomplete
information all favour local production."" A recent expert workshop projected
relatively modest leakage rates that could be substantially reduced through
output-based rebates.
Leakage is countered to the extent that mitigation efforts lead to the
generation of new technology that is adopted elsewhere. 0 The interaction
between technological change and impacts on energy prices (the price effect) is
somewhat understudied. The scant existing research on technology effects and
leakage indicates that the key factors are the elasticity of demand, scarcity of
fossil fuels, and substitutability between clean and carbon-based energy."
75
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Regulators can also reduce leakage by excluding industries that compete
with foreign firms from the trading system, by giving free allowances82 or by
granting rebates on carbon taxes for exports." When the regulating jurisdiction
is also a major importer, border measures can discourage leakage, with
particularly strong effect if producers maintain unified production lines." A
recent modeling effort concludes that leakage can also be reduced if other
countries anticipate that they will become subject to binding limitations in the
future or can sell offset credits to countries that are controlling mitigations."
Expanding the economic size of the coalition engaged in abatement also
decreases leakage." It should also be possible to reduce leakage by taking steps
to reduce the supply of fossil fuels, such as restrictions on coal mining or
offshore drilling.
The magnitude of leakage is clearly subject to considerable uncertainty. The
available evidence seems to point toward two conclusions. The first is simply
that leakage is a genuine problem, not a red herring. The second is that leakage is
unlikely to be a severe problem for well-designed mitigation measures,
particularly if the effort involves a large economy or group of economies.
IV. STRATEGIC BENEFITS AND COSTS OF SUBGLOBAL ACTION
Although measuring leakage is not easy, it is even more difficult to
determine how mitigation efforts could affect policies in other jurisdictions or
the likelihood of international agreement. Political effects of mitigation measures
can take many forms. Even purely symbolic efforts may have some positive
spillover effects, as Posner and Weisbach explain:
One symbolic action can lead to another, and as more and more people take
actions with similar goals, a sense may develop that enough people care
about a problem to make substantive government action possible. Support
for symbolically potent but environmentally trivial [actions] . . . , then, may
82
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help spread the word about climate change and convince people around the
world that enough people care about this problem to make significant
emission limits possible.87
Predicting how subglobal efforts may impact later negotiations is not a
simple matter. The impacts of subglobal mitigation on subsequent negotiations
are complex. A binding pre-commitment by one party to reduce emissions
sharply could undermine negotiations by reducing the urgency of climate action
by other parties and by limiting the bargaining power of the pre-committed
party." This slacking-off effect implies counterintuitively that jurisdictions
actually could encourage mitigation efforts elsewhere and improve international
coordination by increasing their own emissions. In addition, carbon leakage
might increase the economic stakes of other jurisdictions in high carbon
activities, which could impede negotiations by making those jurisdictions
reluctant to abandon these newly profitable activities. But factors operating in
the opposite direction are likely to be more important.
Game theory models provide some insight into the dynamics at work:
This [research] suggests that when countries are willing to increase their
emission reduction commitment if others do the same, cooperation is more
likely. It also suggests that cooperation would be more likely if an
international mechanism were to exist that would allow countries to make a
that discourage
binding conditional commitment. Approaches
"backtracking" are more likely to be successful.89
Subglobal mitigation might satisfy these conditions if mitigation by some
jurisdictions facilitates mitigation by others, and if partial mitigation makes
backsliding less attractive while making it more likely that mitigation efforts will
be reciprocated. Under those circumstances, a virtuous cycle could emerge in
which emission reduction efforts become contagious and mutually reinforcing."o
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Such a virtuous cycle could take hold if reductions by a subset of emitters
are difficult to retract and make it more likely that others will also reduce their
emissions. This dynamic can occur if emissions reductions change the economic
and political balance in favor of reductions by others. Thus, emissions
reductions could promote further mitigation if they increase the economic or
political benefits of further reductions (by the same emitters or others) or
decrease the economic or political costs of those reductions. We will consider a
number of possible pathways for these effects.
Pressure on exporters could provide one mechanism by which mitigation
in some jurisdictions could broaden to include others. One mechanism involves
industry's aversion to patchwork regulations. Lack of uniformity imposes
significant costs on multinationals and producers of traded products. This can
lead industry to support uniform regulation across jurisdictions, even if
industry's ideal outcome would be to have no regulation at all." Sellers' desire
for uniformity helped spark international action to protect the ozone layer, 92 and
a similar desire for uniformity may have contributed to the enactment of major
federal environmental legislation in the 1970s. 93
Lack of uniformity is a problem for the international transportation
industry as well as for exporters. At this writing, the European Union is
apparently attempting to exploit this fact to prompt international action on
carbon emissions from airplanes. The EU has brought international flights under
its trading system, requiring allowances or offsets for all emissions during a flight
(both inside and outside European air space).9 The EU intimated, however, that
it would back down if an international agreement on airline emissions were in
store. 5
The threat of border measures may also give exporting industries an
incentive to support mitigation efforts in their own countries. Countries that
commit themselves to carbon reductions may face significant leakage problems,
which increase the prospect that they will turn to border measures. This
91
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prospect could lead to adoption of mitigation measures by exporting
jurisdictions or by individual companies even without actual adoption of border
measures.
Mitigation measures can also foster mitigation in other jurisdictions by
reducing the cost of regulation or the risk that regulation will be unsuccessful. In
this context, state governments in the US have been called laboratories of
democracy.
Early adopters of climate policies provide tests of policy
effectiveness and the opportunity to learn from policy flaws." It is tempting to
think that policies like emissions trading are well understood and not in need of
such experimentation, but experience shows that designing a well-functioning
cap-and-trade system is no easy matter." Diffusion of successful policies means
that others can learn from these experiences, decreasing the costs of new
policies and increasing their benefits.9 9 Organizations of local jurisdictions can
expedite diffusion.'"t Regional climate agreements, which have emerged within
the US,'o' can also lower policy costs and increase effectiveness by decreasing
leakage and allowing coordination of policy instruments.' 0 2 Indeed, under some
circumstances, linking the trading systems of multiple jurisdictions can lead, in a
bottom-up process, to the creation of a global system.0 3 By demonstrating
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desire and competence to mitigate emissions,'" these efforts can also encourage
broader agreements about climate mitigation.os
Even apart from the opportunity for policy improvement, early adopters
can decrease the risks of new policies for other jurisdictions simply by providing
evidence of costs and benefits. For instance, if California's cap-and-trade system
is successful, that success should dissipate fears in some US quarters that climate
mitigation would be economically disastrous.
Early-mitigating jurisdictions can also lower the cost of further reducing
emissions by fostering technological innovation, which then decreases mitigation
costs for others. Indeed, there may be policy advantages to local over largerscale adoption of technology policies, in part because localized efforts may be
more diverse and may more effectively avoid the risks of picking the wrong
technology.1o' Local efforts may also take advantage of the potential for local
geographic clusters to foster innovation because "spatial concentrations allow
inventors to readily access knowledge that reduces the costs of research,
development, and commercialization."' 07 Improved technology can then lower
the cost of mitigation in other jurisdictions.
Mitigation can also change the political dynamics facing policymakers. As
Eric Biber has pointed out, mitigation policies can create a set of political
supporters in the clean energy industry, thereby reducing the likelihood of
backsliding:
[I]f the new regulatory system requires significant economic investment, it
can inspire the creation of new businesses, industrial systems, employment
opportunities, etc. The individuals and corporations that benefit from this
new economic investment can provide a political base of support for the
new regulatory system, even in the absence of immediate environmental
benefits. . . . To the extent that climate change regulation is able to

encourage the development of (for instance) new industries in renewable
104
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energy, this dynamic may play a role in maintaining support for the
regulatory system.o 8
Indeed, firms that benefit from climate mitigation efforts have an incentive
to press for further mitigation. Correspondingly, opponents of mitigation lose
economic ground during the initial mitigation effort, making them less able to
resist additional mitigation efforts. Thus, initial mitigation efforts may shift the
political dynamics in favor of further mitigation.
This section has sketched some of the economic and political dynamics
that could make cooperation contagious, as jurisdictions gain confidence in each
other and their individual economics and political dynamics shift in favor of
mitigation. There is certainly no guarantee that such dynamics will occur, but the
possibility does provide support for subglobal action. It would be difficult to
provide definitive proof about the relative strength of positive versus negative
feedback effects in the adoption of local mitigation efforts and in international
bargaining positions. To take one example, however, the failure of the US
Congress to adopt climate regulation surely has not been helpful to international
negotiations or encouraged more mitigation efforts in other countries.
Grounds for encouragement can be found in the extensive scholarly
literature on policy diffusion. This literature confirms the existence of a tendency
to imitate jurisdictions with seemingly successful programs.'
Moreover,
countries often emulate similar countries even without evidence of policy
success." 0 Notably, diffusion is well documented in terms of environmental
policies."'
10
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V. CONCLUSION
As we have seen, there is legitimate concern that subglobal mitigation
efforts could be undermined by leakage and might even reduce the impetus to
global agreement. Although these possibilities are real, the evidence suggests that
leakage is likely to be modest. We have also seen that subglobal action under
plausible conditions would be contagious and make global cooperation more
likely. Thus, there are good grounds for optimism about the utility of subglobal
mitigation efforts.
Choosing a strategy depends not only on our expectations about the
strategy but also on our view of alternatives. Even a risky strategy looks good if
the alternatives are less promising. Thus, in considering the desirability of
subglobal action, we must also consider the alternative to engaging in subglobal
action pending global agreement. That alternative is simply to make no efforts at
mitigation until a binding global agreement is in place. It is distinctly
unpromising.
The strategy of waiting for a global agreement poses a host of risks of its
own. Because of the absence of any mitigation efforts, the stock of carbon in the
atmosphere will have grown, requiring sharper emission reductions and more
expensive efforts at mitigation. The added expense would make forming an
agreement more difficult. In addition, mitigation would then have to proceed
with technologies that had never been used at scale and with untested regulatory
schemes, increasing the likelihood of failure. Effective regulatory or taxation
schemes require experience and fine-tuning-learning by doing-in order to be
completely successful. It would be risky to make a global agreement without any
previous practice with the requisite mitigation strategies.
Pending a global agreement, and in the absence of any subglobal mitigation
efforts, the fossil fuel industries in each country would have grown without
restraint, with more long-term infrastructure that locks in these forms of energy.
And finally, since none of the countries involved would have had any history of
mitigation efforts, there would be no track record to establish a sense of mutual
confidence that the agreement will actually be implemented.1 12 This is not an
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appealing scenario. Perhaps eschewing interim measures made a certain amount
of sense when a global agreement seemed more imminent, but it would be hard
to find anyone today who expects such an agreement in the near future.
When dealing with an unprecedented problem like global climate change,
we can never be certain of the best policy response. On balance, however, it
seems wiser for jurisdictions to take the chance of beginning mitigation without
waiting for a global agreement. At a minimum, these efforts communicate a
willingness to negotiate; probably they also reduce total global emissions and
slow climate change. With any luck, they create a feedback effect that will lead
toward global emissions reductions. The alternative strategy of waiting for a
global agreement holds little promise. Subglobal action is not a sure thing, but it
is the best bet for bridging the time until a global regime emerges.

19 NYU Envir L Rev at 56 (cited in note 104). Conversely, heavy investment in coal-fired power
plants signals a "prioritization of economic development over climate concerns." Id.
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